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Lilly v. Virginia: Answering the Williamson
Question-Is the Statement Against Penal
Interest Exception "Firmly Rooted" Under
Confrontation Clause Analysis?

In Lilly v. Virginia' the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that the statement against penal interest exception to the
hearsay rule is too large a class for effective Confrontation Clause2
analysis. However, the Court held that confessional statements made
by an accomplice that incriminate a criminal defendant, a subcategory
of this exception, are not within a "firmly rooted" exception as recognized
under the Confrontation Clause.3
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 4, 1995, Petitioner Benjamin Lilly, his brother Mark
Lilly, and Gary Barker broke into a friend's home and stole a safe, some
liquor, and three loaded guns. The next day they robbed a country store
and abducted Alex DeFilippis. The three men then drove to a deserted
location where one of them shot and killed DeFilippis. They then took
DeFilippis's car and committed two more robberies. Late that evening,
the police arrested all three men.4
After taking them into custody, the police questioned each of the three
men separately. All three stories differed, but Mark and Barker stated
that petitioner shot DeFilippis. Upon further questioning, Mark
admitted that he participated in the burglary and robberies and also
admitted he was present at the homicide. However, Mark maintained
that petitioner was the one who killed DeFilippis. Mark's statements
were recorded on tape.5

1. 119 S. Ct 1887 (1999) (plurality opinion).
2. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted
with witnesses against him ..... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

3. 119 S. Ct. at 1899.
4. Id. at 1892.
5. Id.
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The Commonwealth of Virginia charged petitioner with several
offenses, including DeFilippis' murder. In the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, petitioner was tried separately from Mark and Barker.
During petitioner's trial, the Commonwealth called Mark as a witness
to testify as to what he said during police questioning, but Mark invoked
The
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Commonwealth then sought to introduce Mark's recorded confessions as
statements against penal interest of an unavailable witness, but
petitioner objected to their admissibility. Specifically, petitioner argued
that Mark's statements were not actually statements against penal
interest because the recorded statements shifted criminal liability to
petitioner. Objecting further, petitioner argued that the admission of the
tape recordings would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront an
accusing witness. Over petitioner's objection, the court admitted the
recorded statements. Petitioner was found guilty of robbery and several
other offenses for which the court imposed two life sentences plus
twenty-seven years. Having also been found guilty for the capital
murder of Alex DeFilippis, petitioner was sentenced to death.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed petitioner's convictions and
sentences.7 In its preliminary analysis, the court first concluded that
Mark was an unavailable declarant.8 The court then turned to the
reliability issue and held that Mark's statements were sufficiently
reliable to fall within the exception to the Virginia hearsay rule.'
Accordingly, the court held that petitioner's Confrontation Clause right
was not violated because the statements against penal interest exception
is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 10 Lastly, to the extent
that Mark's statements shifted criminal liability to others, the court held
that this "goes to the weight the jury could assign to them and not to
their admissibility."" Concerned that the Commonwealth's decision
significantly departed from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 2 reversed the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision, and remanded for further proceedings."

6. Id. at 1892-93.
7. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 580, 499 S.E.2d 522, 537-38 (1999).
8. Id. at 573,499 S.E.2d at 533 (citing Boney v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 638, 643,
432 S.E.2d 7, 10 (1993) ("The law is firmly established in Virginia that a declarant is

unavailable if the declarant invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent.")).
9. Id. at 574, 499 S.E.2d at 534.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
13. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1901.
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

The interplay between the constitutional requirements set forth in the
Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of evidence was first
recognized in Mattox v. United States.14 In Mattox the Court held that
the Confrontation Clause's primary purpose was to prevent depositions
and ex parte affidavits from being used against the accused in the place
of in-person cross examination. 5 At the most fundamental level, the
Confrontation Clause compels the witness to "stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief." 6 Consistent with the purpose behind the Bill
of Rights was the possibility that the Framers were attempting "to guard
..society against the oppression of its rulers" in drafting the Confron-

tation Clause. 7 Although the right to confrontation is explicit in the
express terms of the Constitution, the Framers "'obviously intended to
...

respec[t]'" exceptions to this right. 8

Accordingly, much of the

Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has focused on when such exceptions
are constitutionally proper.
Seventy years after Mattox, the Court in Pointerv. Texas"9 held that
an accused's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him
is a fundamental right and therefore made this right obligatory on the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.20 Two years prior to
Pointer,the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright2' had similarly incorporated
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 2
In 1968 the Supreme Court decided the seminal case involving the
confessional testimony of an accomplice against the accused. In Bruton
v. United States,23 the Court held that a codefendant's own confession

14. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The Court explained that "[wie have allowed the admission
of statements falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception since the Court's recognition
in Mattox.. ." Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894.
15. 156 U.S. at 259.

16. Id. at 242-43.
17. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation Clause: A
ProposalFor a ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 560 (1992) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 320, 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
19. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
20. Id. at 403.
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. Id. at 342-43.
23. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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was admissible against him but not against the other codefendant.24
The two codefendants, Bruton and Evans, were tried together for
robbery. During the trial, a witness testified that Evans had told him
that Evans and Bruton had committed the robbery. The jury was
instructed that this statement could be used against Evans, the hearsay
declarant, but it could not be used against Bruton. Despite these
instructions, the United States Supreme Court held Bruton's right to
confront the witness had been compromised, and reversed.25
Two years later the Court analyzed the relationship between state
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. Reversing the California
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court in California v.
Green26 held that although a state may have stringent requirements to
satisfy a hearsay exception, evidence may nevertheless satisfy the
Confrontation Clause even if it fails state requirements.27 In Green the
California rules of evidence prohibited the admission of prior inconsistent statements even when the prior statement was subjected to cross
examination under oath. Though a minority approach, this was a
permissible choice by the California legislature. However, the Court
concluded that nothing in "the Confrontation Clause requires excluding
the out-of-court statements of a witness who is available and testifying
at trial."2" Recognizing an overlap in analysis between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules because both are "designed to protect
similar values," the Court re-emphasized that it has never established
a complete overlap.29
In Ohio v.Roberts,"° the Court sought to formalize the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule analytical interplay and in doing so, set
forth the test that remains in effect today."' Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Confrontation Clause operates in
two ways under a hearsay analysis.3 2 First, it establishes a "rule of

24.

Id. at 126.

25. Id.
26. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id. at 161.
29. Id. at 155. However, one commentator has argued that the Supreme Court has
"constitutionalized 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence" by reading the requirements
under the Confrontation Clause and admission of statements against interest as being
equivalent.

John J. Capowski, Statements Against Interest, Reliability, and the

ConfrontationClause, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 471, 471 (1997).
30. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
31. Id. at 65.
32. Id.
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Under this necessity rule, the prosecution must first

34
either produce the declarant or demonstrate his or her unavailability.
As long as the prosecution can show a good faith attempt was made to
secure the declarant's presence at trial, this standard is usually
satisfied.35 However, as the Court noted, the prosecution is not always
required to demonstrate unavailability.3"
Once the unavailability of the declarant is established, the Confrontation Clause operates under the reliability test.37 The reliability aspect
is further divided into a two prong test. Under the first prong, hearsay
evidence will only be admitted over a Confrontation Clause objection
when the evidence falls into a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 3 No
further inquiry into reliability is needed when the evidence "falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception."39 The second prong, however, does
not create such a per se rule. Under this prong, only evidence "showing
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" will be admitted in
satisfaction of the Confrontation Clause.'
In applying the firmly rooted prong of the reliability test, the Court
has taken great care in defining a firmly rooted exception, primarily
because of the per se nature of this prong. Nevertheless, the Court has
found certain hearsay exceptions that "rest upon such solid foundations
that admission of virtually any evidence" under those circumstances
would satisfy the Confrontation Clause.4 ' Dying declarations appeared
to be the first exception of this nature recognized by the Court.42 Prior
cross-examined testimony, like the testimony in Green and Mancusi, has
also been held to be a firmly rooted exception that satisfies the

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968) (holding that declarant was not
unavailable for confrontation purposes because the prosecutorial authorities had made no

effort to obtain the witness's presence for trial); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212-13
(1972) (holding that declarant was unavailable because he resided in a foreign county and
the authorities had no means of compelling his presence).
36. 448 U.S. at 65 n.7 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (finding the utility
of trial confrontation so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce a
seemingly available witness)). Neither is it a requirement that the prosecution show the
unavailability of a declarant when he or she is a nontestifying coconspirator. United States
v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243-44; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407.
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Confrontation Clause.43 The Court has further held the coconspirator
exception, 44 excited utterances, 45 and statements for the purpose of

medical treatment 46 to be firmly rooted exceptions. In sum, the
that adversarial
statement must fall into an exception "so trustworthy
47
testing would add little to their reliability."

When the statement does not fall into a firmly rooted exception, it is
analyzed under the second prong of the Roberts reliability test.
Although the statement against penal interest exception is a well
recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the Court has yet to rule that
it is a firmly rooted exception. Therefore, the Court has analyzed such
cases under the second prong. Like many cases regarding statements
against penal interest, Lee v. Illinois4" involved the statements of a
codefendant used against the defendant. In Lee codefendants Lee and
Thomas were tried together in a double murder trial. Although both
confessed to the murders, Thomas's confession inculpated Lee. The
Court held that the admission of Thomas's confession in convicting Lee
violated Lee's right to confrontation.49
Instead of addressing whether the statements against penal interests
exception was a firmly rooted exception, the Court in Lee determined
that the confession lacked "indicia of reliability" to overcome the
presumptive unreliability of such statements.50 However, the Court did
imply why statements against penal interests could not be analyzed
under the firmly rooted prong.5 ' Justice Brennan noted that labeling

43. The concern in Green was minimal because the accused was actually given the
opportunity to confront the witness both in the pretrial hearing and the trial. Green, 399
U.S. at 151-52. Unlike Green the accused in Mancusi did not get the opportunity to
confront the witness at trial; however, the Court held the confrontation and cross
examination at the pretrial hearing was sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.
Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 213-16.
44. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) (holding that a court is not
required by the Confrontation Clause to make an inquiry into the independent indicia of
reliability of a statement by a coconspirator).
45. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) (concluding that a statement "offered in
a moment of excitement-without the opportunity to reflect on the consequences..." is so
reliable that its reliability cannot be recaptured later in court).
46. Id. When a statement is given for the purpose of medical treatment, "the declarant
knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, [therefore, such
reliability could not be] replicated by courtroom testimony." Id.
47. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21 (1990).
48. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
49. Id. at 539.
50. Id. The Court examined Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), which
unanimously held that accomplices' confessions that incriminate defendants are
presumptively unreliable, to reach its decision. 476 U.S. at 641.
51. 476 U.S. at 544 n.5.
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this case as a "simple 'declaration against penal interest'" was incorrect
because "[that concept defines too large a class for meaningful
Confrontation Clause analysis." 2 Further, the Court reasoned that
merely because Lee's and Thomas's confessions "interlock," this did not
demonstrate the indicia of reliability necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.5"
Similarly, the Court in Idaho v. Wright'4 refused to find that
corroborating evidence demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. In Wright the statement against penal
interest exception was not involved; rather, the prosecution sought to
introduce a child's out-of-court abuse accusation against the defendants.
Specifically, the child's medical report corroborated her testimony of
sexual abuse.55 However, the Court held that "[aldequate indicia of
reliability ... must be found in reference to circumstances surrounding
the making of the ... statement, and not from subsequent corroboration
of the criminal act."56 Allowing evidence to be admitted merely because
it corroborates a hearsay statement is not the type of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness contemplated by the Confrontation
Clause. 7 As the Court observed, admitting such evidence under these
"bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of
circumstances would allow
58
other evidence at trial."
59
Four years after Wright, the Court in Williamson v. United States
opened the door for the decision in Lilly. Without reaching either the
Confrontation Clause issue or whether the statement against penal
interest exception was firmly rooted, the Court held that the statements

52. Id. However, at least one commentator has questioned the Court and viewed the
Court's avoidance in ruling whether a statement against penal interest is a firmly rooted
exception as an "unwillingness ... to accept the full implications of the per se aspects of
the... [firmly rooted] requirement ...even if a statement... fits within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, its admission may violate the confrontation right." Richard D.
Friedman, Confrontation:The Search for Basic Principles,86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1019 (1998).
53. 476 U.S. at 545. The Court explained interlocking confessions are identical, "[blut
a confession is not necessarily rendered reliable simply because some of the facts it

contains 'interlock' with the facts in the defendant's statement." Id.
54. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 809.
Id. at 821 (quoting State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984)).
Id. at 823.
Id. Although the Court recognized that the plurality in Dutton v. Evans considered

corroborating evidence as one of the four factors in determining indicia of reliability, "the

presence of corroborating evidence" in that case dealt with whether the admission was
harmless "rather than that any basis exists for presuming the declarant to be trustworthy."
Id. (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 90) (Blackman, J., concurring).

59. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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against penal interest exception does not allow the admission of nonselfinculpatory statements, even if they are contained in a generally selfinculpatory statement. °
In a pure evidentiary analysis, the Court
observed that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), 61 statements
that implicated a defendant would not be admissible, while "truly selfinculpatory" statements would be admissible. 2 As the Court explained,
this is a "fact-intensive inquiry" which was not done by either of the two
lower courts, thus the Court remanded for that very purpose. 3
Therefore, the Court avoided the constitutional issue altogether.
However, the Court noted that a genuinely self-inculpatory statement "is
itself one of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,'"
suggesting that such statements, in the future, would not be analyzed
under the firmly rooted prong." This proved to be the case in Lilly.
Since the Court's pronouncement of the firmly rooted prong in Roberts,
the Court has not been clear as to whether the statement against penal
interest hearsay exception is firmly rooted. After the decision in
Williamson, this question remained open. In Lilly v. Virginia,5 a
plurality of the Court answered a portion of this question and closed the
door it left open in Williamson.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In a plurality opinion, the Court in Lilly held that confessional
statements by an accomplice that shift criminal liability to the defendant
do not satisfy the requirements for admission under the Confrontation
Clause.66 The plurality adhered to the Court's view that the general
category of the statement against penal interest exception "defines too
large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." 7 However, the plurality broke down this large class into three manageable
subcategories.6 " One such subcategory, confessional statements by
accomplices that incriminate defendants, are presumptively unreli-

60. Id. at 600-01 (referring to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3), which, in pertinent part, reads,
"statement[s] which ... at the time of [their] making ... so far tended to subject the
declarant to... criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in [the declarant's] position
would not have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to be true.")
61. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
62. 512 U.S. at 604.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 605.
65. 119 S.Ct. 1887 (1999).

66. Id. at 1901.
67. Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5.
68.

119 S. Ct. at 1895.
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able.69 Accordingly, the plurality held that this subcategory is not a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as defined by Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence."v
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, delivered his opinion in six
parts. Only Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter joined Justice
Stevens in the entirety of his opinion. Although a majority of the
Justices joined Justice Stevens in Parts I, II, and VI, these sections of
the opinion contributed nothing to the reasoning. Respectively, Parts I
and II set out the facts and procedural aspects71 while Part VI essentially stated the reversal and remand order.72 The remaining three
parts, however, are where the Justices parted company. For the sake of
simplicity, each of these remaining parts is individually analyzed.
In Part III, joined only by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter,
Justice Stevens discussed a criminal defendant's right under the
Confrontation Clause and how this right may be limited. 73 Relying on
the Court's precedent, Justice Stevens further explained that the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to prevent the admission of
unreliable evidence against the defendant by subjecting such evidence
to the rigors of an adversarial proceeding. 74 Although the common law
concern of "prosecuting a defendant through the presentation of ex parte
affidavits, without the affiants ever being produced at trial" is a present
concern, the Court has rejected construing the Confrontation Clause so
narrowly as to apply only to such practices.75 Consistent with the
Court's prior cases, the plurality reasoned that such a restrictive reading
7 6
would eliminate the admission of hearsay testimony.
Accordingly, the
77
proper approach is the two-part test in Roberts.
In Parts IV and V, the plurality turned to the Roberts dual inquiry
devoting each part to each prong of the Roberts test.78 Relying on
Mattox, decided over one hundred years ago, the plurality acknowledged
the admission of statements falling into a firmly rooted hearsay
exception as well recognized Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.7 9
Such statements are firmly rooted if they have a "longstanding judicial

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1897.
Id. at 1899.
Id. at 1892-93.
Id. at 1901.
Id. at 1893-94.
Id. at 1894 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).
Id. (citing White, 502 U.S. at 346).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and legislative experience,""0 or they "'rest [on] such [a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with
the "substance of the constitutional protection."'""
In sum, the
plurality reasoned that in "[e]stablished practice" statements must fall
into a hearsay category that ensures guarantees "equivalent to, or
greater than, those produced by the Constitution's preference for crossexamined trial testimony." 2
As to the statement against penal interest exception, Justice Stevens
distinguished the exception from other firmly rooted exceptions and for
the first time, explicitly explained why this general category "'defines too
large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.'" 3 Firmly
rooted exceptions, such as excited utterances, are presumed reliable
because they are made without motive or time to reflect on the legal
consequences of such statements.84 However, a statement against
penal interest "is founded on the broad assumption 'that a person is
unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it
is made.'"8 5 Furthermore, unlike other firmly rooted exceptions, the
statement against penal interest exception encompasses three categories:
(1) statements made by the declarant and offered into evidence against
the declarant; (2) confessional statements offered by the defendant as
exculpatory evidence; and (3) an accomplice's confessional statement
offered by the prosecution that incriminates a defendant.8 8
This third category, as the plurality observed, covers statements like
7 Since Crawford v. United States88
the ones made by Mark Lilly.
over ninety years ago, the Court has consistently held such statements
to be presumptively unreliable. 9 In holding that such statements are

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Wright, 497 U.S. at 817.
Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1895 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
Id.
Id. (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5)
Id.
Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973)).

86. Id. Justice Stevens noted that because the second category of statements is offered
by the accused, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated. Id. Moreover, only in cases
similar to Bruton and Lee, where codefendants are tried together, does the first category

implicate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1895-96.
87. Id. at 1897.
88. 212 U.S. 183 (1909).
89. 119 S.Ct. at 1897. In Crawford the Court stated that when the confession of an
accomplice "incriminate[s] himself together with defendant... [this] ought to be received
with suspicion. ... " 212 U.S. at 204. This notion was adopted in Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), and reaffirmed in Lee. 119 S.Ct. at 1897.

20001

LILLY V. VIRGINIA

1353

not a firmly rooted exception, the plurality reasoned that it was merely
reaffirming a long line of Supreme Court precedent."°
In Part V the plurality addressed the second prong of Roberts and
rejected the assertion that the circumstances surrounding Mark Lilly's
statements bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 9'
Although this inquiry is a fact-based inquiry, the plurality rejected the
notion "that appellate courts should defer to the lower courts' determinations regarding whether a hearsay statement has particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."92 However, the plurality accepted the
Virginia courts' determination for the purposes of its state hearsay rule
but held that courts need to perform an "independent review" as it
relates to the Confrontation Clause.93 The plurality did not explicitly
state the distinction between the two inquires; however, it reasoned that
"[ilt is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability ... [of]
accomplices' confessions that shift or spread blame can be effectively
rebutted .....
Justice Stevens concluded the plurality opinion by reaffirming Wright
and reasoning that the use of corroborating evidence does not demonstrate particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.9 5 The fact that
Mark was given his Miranda warnings and was not offered immunity
adds nothing to the reliability of his statement.'
Relying on the
Court's language in Wright, the plurality further reasoned that
admitting the statements would allow the "State to 'bootstrap on' the
trustworthiness of other evidence."97
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer wrote
separately to exclusively address amici curiae briefs and a groundswell
of scholarly commentary criticizing the Court's effort to tie the Confrontation Clause so directly to the hearsay rule. 9 As Justice Breyer read
this criticism, the current hearsay-based Confrontation Clause test is, on
one hand, too narrow in that it allows the admission of hearsay evidence
prepared for trial merely because it falls within a certain exception. 99

90. 119 S. Ct. at 1899 n.5.
91. Id. at 1899 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).

92. Id. at 1900.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Court's repeated failure to concisely distinguish between the Confrontation
Clause reliability and hearsay rule reliability has been a point of issue with at least one
commentator. See Capowski, supra note 29, at 513.
95. 119 S. Ct. at 1900 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 822).

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1900-01.
98. Id. at 1902 (Breyer, J., concurring).

99. Id.
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On the other hand, it is too broad because it makes a constitutional
issue out of the admission of any relevant hearsay statement. 010
Justice Breyer did not answer this concern directly because in this case
the statement nevertheless violated the Confrontation Clause; however,
he concluded that the issue is open to be evaluated at another time.'
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
concluded that the introduction of the recorded tapes at trial without
making Mark available for cross-examination was "a paradigmatic
Confrontation Clause violation. " 10 2 Justice Scalia chose not to join the
plurality in its discussion of Roberts and stated "[s]ince the violation is
clear, the case need be remanded only for a harmless-error determination."103
Also concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice
Thomas adhered to his view that the Confrontation Clause "'extends to
any witness ... testify[ing] at trial"' and only applies to out-of-court
statements that are "'formalized testimonial material.'' 1 4 Unlike
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that
the Confrontation Clause does not require a "blanket ban" on accomplices' statements that incriminate a defendant.0 5 Further agreeing with
the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas concluded that the plurality should
not have addressed the Roberts second prong because the Virginia
Supreme Court did not analyze the statements under this prong.'06
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
0 7 Sounding more like a dissenting
concurred in the judgment only."
opinion, the Chief Justice first disagreed with the plurality attempting
08
to "systematiz[e]" the statement against penal interest exception.
As a result, the plurality's "complete ban on the government's use of

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1903.
102. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. Justice Scalia's originalist approach and his concurrence with Justice Thomas
in White most likely explain Justice Scalia's decision in not joining the Roberts discussion.
In White the two Justices concluded that "[tihe standards that the Court has developed to
implement its assumption that the Confrontation Clause limits admission of hearsay
evidence have no basis in the text of the Sixth Amendment." White, 502 U.S. at 363
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Cornelius M.
Murphy, Note, Justice Scalia and The Confrontation Clause: A Case Study in Originalist
Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1243, 1247-48 (1997).
104. 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
108. Id. at 1904.
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accomplice confessions that inculpate a codefendant" was overbroad. °9
In the Chief Justice's view, this broad holding failed to distinguish
custodial statements given to law enforcement officials from noncustodial statements, like those given to family members or fellow
prisoners.110 As demonstrated in Dutton v.Evans,"' non-custodial
statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability to be placed before a jury
without confrontation of the declarant.1 2 Moreover, consistent with
several Courts of Appeals, the Chief Justice saw no reason to exclude
even custodial statements that equally inculpated the declarant and
defendant. 1 3 Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist would have limited
the holding only to self-serving custodial confessions." 4
The Chief Justice also disagreed with the plurality's analysis of the
second prong of the Roberts inquiry.'15 Both the trial court and the
Virginia Supreme Court analyzed Mark's recorded statements solely
under the firmly rooted prong and thus, never got to the second prong.
Therefore, as Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, reviewing an issue that
court did not decide is at odds with Supreme Court precethe lower
6
dent."
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Prior to Lilly the Court had never directly answered the question of
whether the statement against penal exception was firmly rooted. Since
Lee the Court merely rested on Justice Brennan's footnote language that
statements against penal interest "define[s] too large a class for
meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis."" 7 By subdividing this
"large class" into its three subcategories, the plurality in Lilly has, in
part, answered the question. The plurality made explicit that one of

109. Id.
110. Id. at 1904-05. Specifically, the Chief Justice took issue with the fact that the
plurality labeled Dutton as an exception to the "unbroken line of cases" demonstrating that
accomplices' confessions are presumptively unreliable. Id. at 1905. The Chief Justice
argued that Dutton was not an exception because that case involved a confession to a fellow
prisoner, while the other cases cited by the plurality involved custodial statements to law
enforcement officials. Id.
111. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
112. Id. at 89.
113. 119 S. Ct. at 1904 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (the "entire statement inculpated
both ... equally" and neither attempted to shift blame to his co-conspirators)).
114. Id. at 1905.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1905-06.
117. 476 U.S. at 544 n.5.
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these subcategories, confessional statements by accomplices that
inculpate a criminal defendant, "are not within a firmly rooted exception
to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence." 118
However, Lilly probably goes further than what the plurality explicitly
held and stands for the proposition that the entire exception is not
firmly rooted. As the plurality observed, statements against penal
interests arise in only three situations and the two other situations, or
subcategories, rarely implicate the Confrontation Clause." 9
The first of these remaining two subcategories, statements made by
the declarant and offered into evidence against the declarant, is a classic
Unless there is an issue
declaration against interest scenario.120
similar to that in Bruton or Lee, where codefendants are being tried
together, this situation rarely implicates the Confrontation Clause. The
declarant and defendant are the same person, thus no hearsay issues are
present and consequently, no hearsay exception arises. Therefore,
statements made under these circumstances are almost always admitted
without invoking any hearsay or Confrontation Clause concerns.
Similarly, the other subcategory, confessional statements offered by
the defendant as exculpatory evidence, almost never implicate the
Confrontation Clause. 2' In this situation a hearsay concern may
arise, but it is the defendant who is attempting to make use of the
evidence. The Confrontation Clause only prohibits non-cross-examined
statements from being used against the accused; nothing in the
Confrontation Clause
prohibits the defendant from introducing such
122
evidence himself.
Finally, with regard to Chief Justice Rehnquist's overbroadness
concern, there is nothing in the plurality's opinion that would create a
complete ban on non-custodial confessions like those in Dutton. In fact
the plurality recognized Dutton as a case with "unique aspects" thus
suggesting that such statements were not included in its holding."2
Furthermore, admitting confessional statements that equally inculpate
the declarant and defendant, as several Courts of Appeals have done,
presents a danger already addressed by the Court. As Justice O'Connor

118. 119 S. Ct. at 1899.
119. Id. at 1895-97.
120. Id. at 1895.

121. Id. at 1897.
122. Id. Moreover, "the Due Process Clause affords criminal defendants the right to
introduce into evidence third parties' declarations against penal interests..." Id. (citing
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300).

123. Id. at 1899 n.5.
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concluded in Williamson, "[olne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive
because of its self-inculpatory nature."124 It is this type of unreliable
testimony that the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence seeks to
exclude.
Effectively, the plurality held that all three categories of the statement
against penal interest exception are not firmly rooted. However, the
lower courts will nevertheless have to analyze such statements under the
appropriate subcategory in making a Confrontation Clause determination. If the Court "duck[ed]" the constitutional issue in Williamson, as
one commentator asserts, then in Lilly the Court met the issue head on
and answered the question."2
KIM MARK MiNiX

124. 512 U.S. at 599-600.
125. See Capowski, supra note 29, at 507. "This ducking of the Sixth Amendment issues
is bound to continue the confusion and disarray among the circuit courts." Id.
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